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Joseph Dietzgen was a philosopher and a tanner. At the congress for the
International in The Hague in 1872, Marx called him 'our philosopher', the
philosopher of proletarian social democracy; he also said once that Dietzgen was
one of the most brilliant workers he knew. Dietzgen was a self-educated philo-
sopher. On the political scene, he played a part in the notorious'Haymarket'
affair in Chicago in 1886; one of the events which led to the introduction of
annual First of May celebrations of the international labour movement. After his
death on 15 April 1888, Dietzgen was buried next to the executed 'Chicago
martyrs'.
Dietzgen was one of the first from within the labour movement to publish a
review of 'Das Kapital'. It is remarkable that he should derivephilosophical ideas
from Marx's principal work. Dietzgen's best known publication is Das Wesen der
Menschlichen Kopfarbeit', which was published in 1869, after he had first presen-
ted Marx and Engels with the manuscript.
In the history of Marxist thinking, Dietzgen occupies a special place. His work
represents the rapidly growing class consciousness of his time. He focused his
attention on Marx's work, at a time when there was no systematic development
of Marx's ideas to speak of. Dietzgen was one of the few within the social
democratic labour movement of the day to be immersed in the study of philo-
sophy. Based in particular on Feuerbach, Marx, Kantianism and the development
of the natural sciences, the 'self-educated manual labourer' Dietzgen advocated
materialist dialectics and a dialectic-materialist epistemological theory. These, in
his view, are a contribution to 'proletarian logic', a theory which expresses the
system of relationships of being and thinking as the 'highest' form of philoso-
phical awareness.
Questions regarding Dietzgen's philosophy
Dietzgen's philosophy is monistic in nature. This study is focused on the question
in what way Dietzgen treats the relation between unity and diversity as an
epistemological and ontological issue. How does Dietzgen formulate the unity of
all that exists, and what is the place and the role of the process of gaining
knowledge in this formulation? These questions serve as stepping stones to the
central question: What is the position of Dieagen's thinking with regard to the
philosophy of Feuerbach, and that of Maa. and Engels? This is an important
question in the light of the history of the labour movement. In the early years of
this century, Dietzgen's work became a subject of discussion. Some said that
Dietzgen had nothing to add to Feuerbach's philosophy; others regarded him as
the perfect Marxist philosopher. This discussion has not ended. The present study
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sccks to clari fy thc posit ions in this discussion by mcans of an analysis of
Dictzgen's phi losophy i tsclf .
This raiscs the addit ional qucstions <lf  iLs relat ion to Kant's epistemological
thcory, to scicnti l ic and Dar*, inist-oricnted material ism, and to Dietzgcn's cthical
idcas and cri t icism of rcl i Ír ion.
I)ietzgen's phi krsophy
Dictzgen charactcrizcs thought as the elcvation of thc specif ic to the univcrsal;  i t
is thc systemilt izat ion of specif ic facls. Svstematization is thc corc of thc process
oÍ 'gaining knowlcdgc, an<l of scicncc. By mcans of thought, a univcrsal concept is
found which dcÍines thc unity of thc many scnsory phcnomena. Dietzge n rcÍ 'crs to
his phi losophv as an cpistemological thcory without rcducing rhc phi losophy ro a
thcorv of thc proccss of gaining knowledgc. In a cri t ical sense, Kant's prcscnce is
unmistakably felt in Dictzgen's opistemoktgical theory. As a critical rcacrion to
thc Kantian 'Ding an sich', DiaÍr.gcn takes the world as it exists as a starting poinr
for cvcry thought and action; hc formulatcs the fundamental attainabi l i ty of
unl imited knowledgc ol the w<trld. This cpistemological interest harbours a
prof<rund intcrcst in issucs of frccdom and just icc. Within thc labour m<lvcmcnt,
Dictzgcn was one of thc f irst sincc the r isc <lf  the 'back to Kant'- trend to distance
himsclf from Kantianism.
From 1877 <lnwards, Dictzgen's work cxprcsses morc clcarly thc need t<l make
ontological statemcnts. This neod arises as a reaction to the r isc of neo-Kantian
and agnostic modes oÍ thoughl. The ref lcct ion of thcse views within the labour
movcment urges him to rcspond more directly to thc agnostic position. Hc also
rcsponds to E,.du Bois-Reymond, who had concluded on the basis of the dcvelop-
mcnt of natural scienccs, that ccrtain essential phi losophical issues cannot be
rcsolved; from this he inferred that human knowledge is fundamcntal lyl imitcd. In
a rcaction to agnosticism, Dietzgcn treads <tn dangerous metaphysical ground. If
onc intends to refutc thc idea that the extcnt of human knowlcdge is funclamcn-
tal lv l imited, then the opposite should be argued. Dicrzgen's idca of fundamen-
tally unlimitcd knowlcdge is rootcd in the world itself. 'Total cohcrcnce'
('Gesamízusanmtenhang'), understood from a materialistic point of view, governs
thought. Thc thcoretical attainabi l i ty of unl imired knowlcdge implies knowle<lge
of infinite totality; it excludes thc possiblc cxistenrc of fundamental limir^s. A
histrlrically situaled statc of incomprehension cxists. This is part of the proccss of
'Conciliation' ('Annàhcntng'), in which modes of rhoughr rcflect a grclwing
understanding ol the world, with the proviso thal in rhis proccss, i t  is also
undcrstood that al l  cxist ing knowlcdge is l imited.
Dietzgen's work is sometimes interprotcd from a Spinozistic perspcctive,
bccause of the emphasis on univcrsal dialcct ic cohercnce of al l  that exiss. In
placcs wherc he gives a positive assessment of Spinoza's philosophy, it is not so
much the Spinozist Dictzgen who idol izcs his source, but rather a nine-
tocnth-ccntury self-educatcd monist who recognizcs the way in which a
phikrsophical predeccssor strugglcs with thc same issucs in his own way.
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In Dietzgen's materialism, thought is governed by 'total coherence'. This
presupposes the existence of objective dialectics which encompass subjective
dialectics. This recognition of objective dialectics, however, is problematic in ils
formulation. Objective dialectics as the determining factor in the process of
gaining knowledge is insufficiently emphasized. As a result, Dietzgen's epistemo-
logical theory underscores the subjective aspect. Reality seems almost entirely to
play a passive part in the process of gaining knowledge. On a more concrete level
- for instance the explanation of ethical views - Dietzgen, on the basis of
Feuerbach's philosophy and Max's historical materialism, does show an interest
in the way in which the manifestations of objective reality govern the content and
development of thought.
In his rejection of limited materialism based on natural science, Dietzgen also
emphasizes the need for further development of philosophy. He recognizes the
topicality of critical philosophical materialism, a form of materialism in which
Kant's philosophy is critically incorporated, inst€ad of silently neglected. The
subjective aspect should be fully recognized, especially in a materialistic
philosophy.
Dietzgen's theory of knowledge harbours an epistemological nd an ontological
perspective. According to Dietzgen, the process of gaining knowledge is a process
of reflection as well as an activity of thought. In thought, everything is reproduced
subjectively, after which it, as it were, leads a new and subjective existence. Every
abstraction by the faculty of thought is based on a reflection of reality. Thought
reunites everything which appears to have been separated in the sensory perspec-
tive; in this way it is possible to reconstruct totatity. Thought transcends direct
empiricism, and is in this respect 'metaphysical', a term which Dietzgen does not
often use in this positive sense.
Dietzgen refers to the faculty of knowledge as a 'spiegelartiges Instrument'
('a mirrorJike instrument'). His monism emphasizes the total coherence of all
that exists. This coherence in reality presupposes an all-embracing unity. Every
part of nature in its own specific way is an expression of nature in is entirety.
This is also true for thought, which in its own specific way also expresses reality.
Each particular object represents itself or individuality, but is at the same time an
expression of the cosmos which is in a state of constant development. Viewed
from this ontological perspective of universal relationality, the epistemological
view of reflection is a specific instance of the general relation between the
specific and the universal, in which the specific and the universal are reflected in
a particular way.
Dietzgen is one of the first of the 'Marxists' who theoretically begins to think
through ethical issues. He uplains morality, without formulating his own practical
ethics. Feuerbach's philosophy and Marx's basis-superstructure thesis ring
through: material existence governs life and thought. Dietzgen has been
reproached for taking a utilitarian position. The question is whether or not in the
end he excludes a utilitarian approach. Dietzgen recognizes the basis of ethics in
the materially governed human needs and emotions. These needs have to be ful-
filled in order to make general human progress possible. He rejecs an abstract
morality which is not based on actual human needs and emotions. In order to
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cncouragc gcncral human moral progrcss, the way in which Lrthical conccpts
actual lv cvolvc and on which thcv are basccl musl bc understood.
ln l \ ' larx's work. theorv and pracl icc are morc clctscl l '  rclatcd than in Dictzgcn's
analvsis. Dictzgon appoars primari ly to bc intercstcd in f inding an adcquate
nrcthod nÍ gaining knowlcdge, which can subscqucntlv bc appl icd in praetice.
Both instanccs of thc re lat ion bct\\ 'een thcon' and practice , however, arc not
s tud icd  in  rc la t ion  to  onc  ano lhcr .  But  thc re  e rc  a lso  p laccs  * 'hc rc  D ic tzgcn
fir lkrws Marx's ideas morc closcly. Rcl igion has cul l ivalod thc mind, ht:  says; bul
hascd on  thought .  th is  cu l tu rc  shou ld  cu l t i va te  thc  reu l  wor ld .  and in  do ing  so
chungc i t .  ln  Feuerbuch 's  ph ik rsophr ' ,  thc  idca  is  cxp la incd  f rom a  matc r ia l i s t Íc
pcrspcc t ivc .  bu t  in  thc  dcve lopmcnt  o í 'h is  conc lus ions ,  Fcuerbach is  ambiva lcn t l
hc chooses thc rcform:rt ion oÍ thought in part icular as primurl objcct ivc. ln
N,lurx's vie*' .  rc: l i rrmation of thought is not possiblc rvi lhout rc[ormation ol thc
wor ld ,  w i thout  a  rcvo lu t ion iz ing  rca l i t v .  An t l  l i r r  tha t  rca l i t v ,  suh jcc t i v in  shou lc l  bc
undorstood Írom a m:rtcr ial ist ic pe rspectivc. Dictzgon sccms to share this vrel|  in
s0nrc  o f  h is  s la temcnts .  cven though thcsc  ha \ 'o  no t  bccn  w0rkcd  ou l  in  3
ph ik rsoph ica lse  nse  . ln  h is  e  p is tcmolog ica l  thcon,  r ra l i t r  i s  no t  dcvc lopc( l  in to  an
cxplanatorv conce pt. In this rcspcci,  Dic:tzgen's phi losophv onlv part ial lv
corrcspclnds lo Marx's vicw as rcÍ lccted in Marx's cri t ic ism on Fcucrbach. In thc
crp is tcmolog ica l  sensc ,  D ic tzgen 's  ph i losoph l  i s  p redominated  bv  a  v ieu  in  r " 'h ich
thc  sub jec t  has  a  senson, .  re f l cc t i vc  re la l ion  to  a  rc l i i t v  wh ich  secms to  hc  on lv
passir.ely prcscnt. I t  is possiblc that N4arx's f irst Feucrhach-thesis rcftrs to
D ic tzscn 's  th ink ing .
D ic tzgcn 's  a r Í tumen l  cun  hard lv  he  ca l l cu  log ica l l v  sound;  i t  shorvs  gaps  and
somctimcs alkrws f0r vurious lnlcrprct i t t ions. By taking Feucrhach's c()nccpt C)Í
scnson pcrccp t ion  as  a  s ta r t ing  po in t ,  D ic tzgcn makcs  i t  poss ih lc  to  ph ik lsoph ize
matcr ia l i s t i ca l l v  and a l  thc  samc t ime to  do  jus t i ce  to  the  ind iv idua l  sub jcer i re
proccss of thought as an activi ty in which concepls arc deveklpcd. At thc same
limc, the conccpt of scnsory pcrccption uncovers a wcak spot in Dictzgen's
th ink ing :  thc  poss ih i l i t v  o Í '  a  na ivc .  cmpi r i c is t  in tc rp rc ta t ion  o f  i t .  Feucrb l rch 's
c rnphas is  on  scnson pcrcep l ion  imp l ies  thc  r i sk  o f  iunor ing  Kant 's  cp is tcmo-
klgical cr i t ic ism. Evcn though Dictzgen l inks up closclv with Fcucrbach's concepi
oÍ scnsory pcrccption as a concopl on thc hasis of which important phi losophical
problcms can hc analvzcd, hc makes a cri t ical analvsis ol lhe proccss of thought.
Thc dialect ics ol thc spcciÍ ic and thc univcrsal in the process of gaining
knowlcdge and thc dcvclclpmcnt ol gcncral conccpts, Dietzgcn's 'subjcct ivc'
c r i t i c i sm o f  mcchan ica l  and sc icn t i l i c  matc r ia l i sm and h is  mon is t i c  c r i t i c i sm o f
subjcct ive idcal ism and agnosticism are thÍco ways oÍ approaching the devclop-
mcnt of dialcct ic-matcrial ist ic pistcmokrgv and ontoklgy. In his vicw, a dialcct ic
ontokrpy is thc Í iui t  oÍ an cpistemological krrmulat ion of thc problcm. The
cpistcmological pcrspcctivc olfcrs Dictzgcn acccss to a basic analysis ol the
m:r lc r i l r l  un i l v  o f  i l l l  l h l l t  ( ' x i sLs .
Fr<lm an ovcral l  vicw oÍ Dictzgcn's work, i t  can hc said that as far as the
formulation oÍ material ist ic dialcct ics is conccrned, Dictzgen occupies a posit ion
' in-he tu,ccn' Feuerbach and Marx. hut with a theorct iurl  l ink to Marx.
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Dietzgenism as revisit lnism
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Dietzgenism as revisionism
At the time of the Second International, discussions arose on the interpreration
of Dietzgen's work. These discussions, however, did not produce an unambiguous
interpretation. Besides other revisionist schools of thought, so-called 'Dietzgenism'
arose, of which Dietzgen's son Eugen was one of the leading figures. Dietzgenism
Íepresents one of the views that take as a starting point the proposition that
Marx's merits are limited mainly to the formulation of historical materialism, and
that his work lacks a sound philosophical basis. Dietzgenism suggests rhar
Dietzgen's work pre-eminently provides the philosophical foundation to scientific
socialism.
The contribution from the Netherlands to the Dietzgen-discussion is relatively
significant. H. Roland Holst is sometimes referred to as a Dietzgenist, while
A Pannekoek shows many signs of Dietzgen-reception. The present study con-
cludes that a characterization of Roland Holst as a Dietzgenist is unwarranted.
Pannekoek, however, did contribute to the promotion of Dietzgen's thinking as
pre-eminent Marxist philosophy. Pannekoek places Marx and Engels on the one
hand and Dietzgen on the other in the two separate domains of historical
materialism and dialectical materialism, respectively.
Dietzgen's contribution to scientific socialism
Dietzgen was one of the first to refer to socialism which is focused on Marx as
'scientific socialism'. He was almost certainly the first to use the term 'dialectical
materialism' to refer to the philosophy of social democracy. ln 'Ludwig
Feuerbach', Engels writes that oddly enough, materialist dialectics were not only
rediscovered by Marx and himself, but also by Dietzgen, independently from
them and from Hegel. The present study shows thal Dietzgen's rediscovery was
not made entirely independently from them.
Since the dramatic developments in Eastern Europe, all topical political and
ideological discussions are reviewed from a new perspective. A new consistent,
theoretical-political image is called for, if one is to acknowledge the significance
of socialist ideals. This also implies the need for an open-minded interpretation of
the work of those who contributed to socialism and communism. In this respect,
Dietzgen can be interpreted as an original and self-conscious member of the
working class. As a socialist, he based his ideas on Marx, but he never slighted his
own thinking; in times when socialism was under pÍessure, he adhered to socialist
and age-old humanist ideals.
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